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this is the first EUSA review published under the 
guidance of Amie Kreppel, member of the executive 
committee. Amie has taken over the responsibility for 
editing the EUSA reviews from Craig Parsons. From 
spring 2007 to summer 2009 Craig edited eight EUSA 
reviews. This was a demanding task which Craig mas-
tered in an impressive way with excellent results. In 
accomplishing this he relied on the cooperation of a 
large number of different authors/EUSA members who 
made highly interesting contributions on important po-
litical, legal and economic developments in the Eu-
ropean Union and worldwide. Important support was 
given by Joe Figliulo, the executive director of EUSA. 
In the name of the entire executive committee 
– and I am sure all EUSA members - I would like to 
thank Craig for having accomplished such a great job 
over the last two years. Thanks, of course, also to 
Amie who accepted to follow in Craig’s steps and take 
on the task. Editing the review is a formidable task. 
Based on the outcome of an informal survey of EUSA 
members attending the Los Angeles conference as to 
the desirable frequency of reviews per year, the ex-
ecutive committee decided to reduce the number of 
issues from four to three issues per year…still a for-
midable task.
We wish Amie all the best for her work. As the 
present issue shows we may be confident that the 
new editor will sustain the tradition of high quality con-
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French Socialists posted record lows, of 16 and 17 
percent, respectively.  The German SPD slumped to 
21 percent.  In Italy the new Democratic Party, formed 
by ex-communists and left-wing Christian Democrats, 
were beaten by almost 10 percent by Berlusconi’s new 
People of Freedom party.  Social democratic parties 
came third in Finland, the Netherlands, Poland and 
Ireland, fourth in Flanders, fifth in Estonia, and were 
well beaten by centre-right parties in Austria, Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain.  Socialists topped the 
polls in Sweden, Denmark, Greece, Wallonia, Latvia, 
Malta, Romania, and Slovakia.  But these successes 
counted for little against the huge losses for the cen-
tre-left in the other EU member states.
As a result, the main centre-left group in the new 
European Parliament – now called the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, to appease the 
Christian Democratic wing of the new Italian party – 
only has 184 seats, compared to 266 for the EPP (fig-
ure 1).  Not only is this a significant gap between the 
two largest parties, but as a share of the seats (25 per-
cent) this is the smallest representation of socialists 
in the European Parliament since the first elections 
in 1979.  And, if one counts the period when the Eu-
ropean Parliament was composed of delegates from 
national parliaments, the 2009-14 Parliament has the 
smallest socialist group in over 50 years (Hix, Kreppel 
and Noury 2003).
Figure 1. Composition of the Outgoing and Incom-
ing European Parliament in June 2009
THE 2009 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS
The 2009 European Parliament Elections: 
A Disaster for Social Democrats
Simon Hix
the day after the European Parliament elections, on 8 
June, most newspapers led with the story of ‘the rise 
of the extreme right’.  Gert Wilder’s Party for Free-
dom came second in the Netherlands, picking up 4 
seats.  The British National Party won 2 seats: the 
first seats they had won in a national election.  A new 
anti-gypsy party, Jobbik, won 3 seats in Hungary, and 
the Danish People’s Party won 15 percent of the vote 
and 2 MEPs.  The other big story was a new Euro-
sceptic group in the European Parliament – the Euro-
pean Conservatives and Reformists – led by the Brit-
ish Conservatives and Czech Civic Democrats, who 
broke away from the European People’s Party (EPP) 
to join a rag-tag band of populists, libertarians, and 
social conservatives from Poland, Belgium, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Holland.  A few commentators 
also noticed that the Greens had done well, boosted 
by Dany Cohn-Bendit’s “European Greens” coalition, 
which won 16 percent and 14 seats in France, and the 
German Greens, who won 14 seats there too.  
As the dust began to settle, however, the focus 
turned to the dismal performance of social democrats 
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What explains the collapse of the centre-left and 
the victory of the centre-right in 2009?  The standard 
political science model of European Parliament elec-
tions is the ‘second-order national elections’ model; 
whereby these are mid-term contests in the national 
election cycle, and so tend to produce gains for small 
opposition parties and losses for governing parties 
and large opposition parties (see Reif and Schmitt 
1980 after the first elections, and Hix and Marsh 2007 
on all the elections up to 2004).  This model explains 
quite a lot of what happened in June 2009.  Most gov-
erning parties lost support compared to their perfor-
mance in the previous national election – most spec-
tacularly in Britain – and small opposition parties on 
both the right (the extreme right and anti-Europeans) 
and the left (the greens and the radical left) did well. 
Indeed, a model of the 2009 elections by myself and 
Michael Marsh, based on a simple second-order na-
tional elections model, correctly predicted 90 percent 
of the MEPs won by national parties and 98 percent of 
the seat-shares of the European political groups (see 
www.Predict09.eu).  So, not bad!
However, the second-order national elections 
model does not really explain the poor performance 
of the social democrats.  In previous European Par-
liament elections particular party families have done 
well, such as the greens in the 1989 elections (Cur-
tice 1989), and the anti-Europeans in 1994 (Taggart 
1998).  This time, there seems to have been a nega-
tive ‘party family’ effect for the socialists.  As figure 2 
illustrates, all the mainstream parties in government 
lost votes compared to their previous national elec-
tion performance, but the average loss of support for 
social democratic parties was much larger than for lib-
eral, conservative or Christian democratic parties.  In 
addition, whereas liberals, conservatives, and Chris-
tian democrats in opposition gained votes, socialists 
in opposition tended to lose votes.
Figure 2. Average Percent of Votes Gained/Lost 
by Party Family
Was this outcome simply an accumulation of par-
ticular national-level factors: such as a collapse in sup-
port for parties who have been in power for a long time 
in some states (which partly explain the results in the 
UK, Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Portugal), or 
the failure of social democrats in opposition in others 
to recover from recent national electoral defeats (as 
in France or Italy)?  But this ad hoc explanation fails 
to account for the loss of support for social democrats 
in coalition governments, against the relative success 
of their centre-right coalition partners (as in Austria, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, or Slovenia). 
Something more seismic seems to have happened.
The one universal factor which has rocked political 
systems across Europe is the economic crisis.  The 
credit crunch has clearly affected some European 
countries more than others, with Latvia, Ireland and 
Spain suffering more rapid declines in output than 
Germany, France or the UK, for example.  Nonethe-
less, throughout Europe, party leaders have been 
forced to respond to the crisis, and for several reasons 
the mainstream parties on the centre-left have found 
it far more difficult to do this than the parties on the 
centre-right.  It is a historical fact that voters in Europe 
tend to lean rightwards in times of economic crisis, as 
they did in the 1930s and the late 1970s.  However, it 
also reflects the fact that in the current crisis most par-
ties on the centre-right have adopted many of the eco-
nomic mainstays of the centre-left, such as high public 
spending and Keynesian economic management.  As 
a result, voters cannot tell the difference between the 
centre-right and centre-left, and centre-right leaders in 
many countries look younger, fresher and more com-
petent than centre-left leaders.
Perhaps the clearest example of the failure of the 
centre-left in June 2009 was the inability of the social 
democrats to come up with an alternative candidate to 
José Manuel Barroso for the Commission President. 
Many activists had urged their leaders to put up some-
one against Barroso before the elections; for example, 
at the Party of European Socialists (PES) congress 
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in Madrid in December 2008, many delegates wore 
t-shirts bearing the slogan: “Who is Your Candidate?”. 
Poul-Ryrup Rasmussen, the President of the PES and 
former Danish prime minister, was a popular choice. 
But several key leaders stopped the PES party lead-
ers’ summit from backing Rasmussen.  José Luis Zap-
atero and José Socrates, the Spanish and Portuguese 
premiers, felt an Iberian solidarity with Barroso.  Mean-
while, Gordon Brown, the British prime minister, de-
clared that Barroso was ‘his man’, and anyway wanted 
to minimise the media interest in an election he was 
going to lose badly.  And, Martin Schultz, the German 
SPD leader of the Socialist Group in the European 
Parliament, appeared eager for his group to support 
Barroso in return for EPP support for his candidacy for 
Presidency of the European Parliament.
So, despite Barroso’s lacklustre performance dur-
ing the economic crisis and his perceived eagerness 
to pander to the big member states, the socialists 
failed to field a candidate for the most important post 
in EU politics.  Had they done so, the election cam-
paign might have had a more European flavour, as the 
centre-left’s candidate would have had to put forward 
an alternative agenda for Europe, which might have 
reduced the heavy electoral losses for many social 
democratic parties.
The June 2009 elections will go down as a defeat 
for the centre-left and a victory for the centre-right. 
Whether this is a one-off result, with the centre-left re-
covering in 2014, or whether this is the beginning of 
a fundamental shift in European politics, is uncertain. 
One thing is certain, however, that there will be a lot of 
soul-searching in social democratic circles in the next 
five years.  This might lead to a genuine contest for 
the Commission President in 2014, which would be a 
good thing for the democratic accountability of the EU. 
Don’t hold your breath, though.  The social democratic 
party leaders contrived to avoid this in 2009, and they 
could easily do so again in 2014.
Simon Hix, London School of Economics and 
Political Science
References
Curtice, John.1989.  “The 1989 European Elections: Protest 
or Green Tide?” Electoral Studies 8(3): 217-230.
Hix, Simon, Amie Kreppel and Abdul Noury. 2003. “The Party 
System in the European Parliament: Collusive or Competi-
tive?” Journal of Common Market Studies 41(2): 309-331.
Hix, Simon and Michael Marsh. 2007. “Punishment or Pro-
test? Understanding European Parliament Elections,” The 
Journal of Politics 69(2) 495-510.
Reif, Karlheinz and Hermann Schmitt. 1980. “Nine Second 
Order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework for the 
Analysis of European Election Results,” European Journal 
of Political Research 8(1): 3-44.
Taggart, Paul. 1998. “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepti-
cism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems,” 
European Journal of Political Research 33(2): 363-388.
The European Parliament Elections of 2009 
and the Fate of Euroscepticism
Paul Taggart
the 2009 european parliament elections looked, at first 
glance, like happy hunting grounds for Eurosceptics. 
With Lisbon in limbo and many economies in free-
fall, this looked like a chance for Eurosceptic citizens 
and those who wanted to deliver a message to EU-
supporting national governments to hammer it home. 
Even without these factors EP elections have always 
been good elections for the non-mainstream forces. 
But the outcome was very different. The elections 
were an EU-wide achievement but one without much 
EU content. 
Looking at the overall performance of parties tak-
ing a Eurosceptic position – ranging from the ‘hard’ 
Eurosceptic position of wanting to remove their coun-
try from the EU, to ‘softer’ Euroscepticism with con-
sistently critical positions towards the EU, the aver-
age performance of such parties was 27%.1   In some 
member states, radical protest parties with Euroscep-
tical positions did surprisingly well. In Hungary the far 
right Jobbik surprised many and gained 3 seats in 
the Parliament.  In the UK, the British National Party 
gained its first members of the European Parliament 
with 6% of the vote.  But in reality Euroscepticism 
fared extremely poorly in the elections – and Europe 
fared even worse. 
Why did Euroscepticism perform poorly? The first 
reason that Euroscepticism did so badly is that even in 
those parties with Eurosceptical positons that did well 
in the elections, it was rarely their stance on the EU 
that won them electoral support.  In nearly all cases 
the protest parties were protesting other – either do-
mestic, or more systemic --issues.  The British Nation-
al Party in the UK clearly campaigned on the crisis of 
domestic politics engendered by the expenses row of 
members of the national parliament.  In Hungary, the 
far right and hard Eurosceptic Jobbik won 15% of the 
vote and three seats, but did so in an election where 
European issues were almost entirely absent. Jobbik 
drew support for its nationalism rather than its oppo-
sition to internationalism.2   In the Netherlands, the 
strong performance of Geert Wilders Freedom Party, 
coming second with 17% clearly resulted from its anti-
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Islam and anti-establishment stance rather than its op-
position to the EU .3
Where there were single issue parties taking the 
EU as their issue, such parties performed poorly. The 
June List in Sweden lost all three of its MEPs that it 
had gained in its surprise success during the previ-
ous 2004 European Parliament elections .4  Even in 
traditionally Eurosceptic Britain, the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) actually dropped its share 
of the vote from the previous EP election.  Denmark 
which has Eurosceptical parties that only run in EP 
elections, the June Movement and the People’s Move-
ment Against the EU saw their combined vote drop 
from 14.3 in the 2004 elections to 9.6 and the June 
Movement lost its members of the Parliament.5 
The Eurosceptic ‘dog that did not bark’ was Liber-
tas. In the wake of the Irish Referendum defeat of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the mastermind of the ‘No’ Campaign, 
Declan Ganley, proposed a European-wide Euroscep-
tic party and attempted to run Libertas in all twenty-
seven member states. In the end, Libertas hardly 
registered in the elections. It failed to establish itself 
across all twenty-seven member states and even, in 
some senses, failed to establish itself as a Euroscep-
tic force. Ganley had proclaimed his opposition to the 
Lisbon Treaty, but made it clear that he did not oppose 
European integration in principle. Where it did present 
itself for election, the party presented different identi-
ties in different national contexts. So, it is questionable 
whether if it had succeeded it would have represented 
an entirely Eurosceptic success.
The final reason that we should be very cautious 
about seeing the EP elections as a success for Euro-
scepticism lies in the nature of Euroscepticism itself. 
Comparative work on Euroscepticism that deals with 
in-depth case studies shows clearly that the nature 
of Euroscepticism in different national contexts. It is, 
in fact, so variegated that it can be misleading to talk 
of a unified phenomenon of Euroscepticism across 
Europe.6  Put more simply, the sources of, the issues 
taken up by, and the character of Euroscepticism are 
so different in different member states that we make a 
false generalization if we try and see an overall trend. 
This is not only the difference between the new mem-
ber states of central and Eastern Europe and the other 
member states, but it is also true between West Euro-
pean member states. 
But while Eurosceptics make take little heart from 
the EP results, supporters of European integration 
should also have pause for thought. While there may 
not be a unified Euroscepticism, there was also not a 
unified European election. It is clear that, in fact, there 
were twenty-seven national elections. In all of these 
elections the issue of European integration only re-
ceived a moderate presence in the campaign in six 
member states (Malta, Finland, Sweden, the Neth-
erlands, Denmark and Poland).7  In seven member 
states, experts judge that the issue of European inte-
gration was almost entirely absent. In the rest Europe 
featured irregularly and as an issue of low salience.
The 2009 European Parliament elections did pro-
vide an arena for parties that express Euroscepticism 
to succeed electorally. But such success was limited 
in electoral terms and even where Eurosceptic forces 
gained large shares of the vote they did so on the ba-
sis of other electoral issues and on the basis of elec-
tions largely dominated by domestic, and not Europe-
an concerns.  The EP elections were no great success 
for Eurosceptics, but with the persistence of national 
electoral concerns, they provide no great endorsement 
for a European-wide agenda of integration either.
Paul Taggart, Sussex European Institute
Notes
1 Author’s own calculation based on preliminary infor-
mation kindly provided by authors of EPERN European 
Parliament Briefings.
 2 Agnes Batory. 2009. “The European Parliament Election 
in Hungary, June 7 2009” European Parties Elections and 
Referendums Network European Parliament Briefing No. 
25. Brighton: Sussex European Institute. Available at http://
www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-2.html.
3 Stijn van Kessel and Ben Crum. 2009.  “The European 
Parliament Election in the Netherlands, June 4 2009” 
European Parties Elections and Referendums Network 
European Parliament Briefing No. 28. Brighton: Sussex 
European Institute. Available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/
sei/1-4-2-2.html.
4 Nicholas Aylott and Malena Rosén Sundström. 2009. 
“The European Parliament Election in Sweden, June 
2009’” European Parties Elections and Referendums 
Network European Parliament Briefing No. 37. Brighton: 
Sussex European Institute. Available at http://www.sussex.
ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-2.html.
  
5 Ann-Christina L. Knudsen. 2009. “The European Parlia-
ment Election in Denmark 7 June 2009” European Parties 
Elections and Referendums Network European Parliament 
Briefing forthcoming. Brighton: Sussex European Institute. 
Available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-2.html.
6 Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds.). 2008. Oppos-
ing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepti-
cism 2 volumes, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7 See footnote 1.
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EUSA Economics 
Interest Section Report 
Europe and the Global Financial Crisis1
Dermot Hodson and Lucia Quaglia 
the global financial crisis, which began in 2007 with 
the collapse of the US subprime mortgage market and 
that has yet to run its course, is on a scale that has 
not been seen since the Great Depression. Worldwide 
losses from the crisis, measured in terms of write-
downs on assets originating in the USA, Europe and 
Japan, could be as high as US$4.1 trillion (IMF, 2009, 
p. 30). This financial turmoil has had a devastating ef-
fect on the world economy, with global gross domes-
tic product (GDP) contracting in 2009 for the first time 
since the Second World War and trade likely to ex-
perience its steepest fall since this time (World Bank, 
2009, p. 1).
Europe has not escaped the effects of the global 
financial crisis. The European Central Bank (ECB) ex-
pects write-downs of US$649 billion on securities and 
loans by euro-area banks alone over the period 2007-
10 (ECB, 2009, p. 103). European Union (EU) GDP fell 
by an estimated 4% in 2009, the bloc’s first recession 
since the early 1990s and its worst performance on 
record (European Commission, 2009). This downturn 
has had a dramatic effect on the labour market, with 
the number of people unemployed in the EU-27 ris-
ing by 5.4 million between March 2008 and May 2009 
(Eurostat, 2009).
The acute effects of the global financial crisis on the 
European economy have prompted an unprecedented 
degree of policy intervention at the EU, euro area and 
national level. To begin with, in the short and medium 
term, measures were taken by the European Central 
Bank (ECB), national central banks and EU govern-
ments with a view to unfreezing credit markets, secur-
ing bank deposits and re-capitalising the banking sec-
tor. The national banking rescue plans were subject to 
the approval of the European Commission under the 
rules governing competition policy in the EU, though 
the European Commission adopted a pragmatic ap-
proach to this matter (Quaglia et al. 2009). Central 
banks in the EU and worldwide engaged in a substan-
tial cut of interest rate during the second half of 2008. 
A European fiscal stimulus package was agreed in 
December 2008 and implemented afterward. EU me-
dium term financial assistance was provided to some 
central and eastern European countries, notably Hun-
gary, Latvia and Romania, in conjunction with loans 
from the IMF.
Policy measures in the EU aimed at the longer-term 
have included a regulation on credit rating agencies 
and a proposed directive on hedge funds managers 
(to be precise, alternative investment funds manag-
ers). The de Larosière report (2009), which was pub-
lished in March 2009, proposed the creation of Euro-
pean Systemic Risk Council and a European System 
of Financial Supervision with a view to transforming 
the so-called level 3 committees of national supervi-
sors into EU authorities. Although it is less ambitious 
than the Obama administration’s plans to assign great-
er supervisory powers to the Federal Reserve, the de 
Larosière report (2009) is significant nonetheless. Un-
der an agreement reached at the European Council in 
June 2009, the chair of the European Systemic Risk 
Council will be elected by the General Council of the 
ECB, thus increasing the supranational dimension of 
EU financial market policy as well as expanding the 
bank’s own area of competence. 
Reform proposals in the EU have gone hand in 
hand with a debate on the overhaul of global econom-
ic and financial governance. The G20 has emerged 
as the international venue of choice for heads of state 
and government seeking a coordinated approach to 
bank rescue packages and macroeconomic stimulus 
packages. At the technical level, the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF) (later reformed as the Financial Stabil-
ity Board, FSB by the G-20) has been at the centre 
of various networks of regulators, such as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervisors (BCBS), the In-
ternational Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), the International Associations of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank…etc in elaborating the re-
sponse to the financial crisis. 
Notwithstanding its dramatic effects, the global fi-
nancial crisis represents an extraordinary opportunity 
for students of European political economy. Firstly it 
provides a unique natural experiment for understand-
ing the functioning of Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) in a world of intense but incomplete financial 
integration at the regional and global level. Secondly, 
it offers a case study into the EU’s ability to provide 
policy coordination at home and leadership abroad in 
the absence of more centralised modes of decision-
making. Thirdly, it allows us to observe the response 
of both the euro area and Europe’s distinct models of 
capitalism to a colossal common shock. 
A forthcoming special issue of the Journal of Com-
mon Market Studies, edited by Hodson and Quaglia, 
tackles these and other issues from a variety of dis-
ciplinary backgrounds. It brings together economists, 
political scientists and political economists with the 
aim of putting the European dimension of the global 
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financial crisis in its historical and intellectual context. 
This contribution to the EUSA Political Economy Re-
view, which heavily draws on the introduction of that 
special issue, summarises the volumes key findings 
and highlights issues for future research.
European perspectives on the global financial 
crisis
The origins of the global financial crisis are com-
plex and interconnected (see Brunnermeier et al., 
2009, Financial Stability Forum (FSF), 2008, Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), 2009, Group of Thirty, 2009). 
The contributors to the special issue emphasise dif-
ferent elements of the story although there is broad 
agreement that the economic and financial instability 
witnessed worldwide in 2007 and 2008 originated from 
a combination of domestic and international policy fail-
ures.
The interrelated domestic and international causes of 
the financial crisis
Louis Pauly locates the roots of the crisis in the 
unwillingness of national governments to engage in 
cross-border policy coordination following the col-
lapse of the original Bretton Woods system in the early 
1970s. For all the talk of macroeconomic imbalances 
in international institutions and fora over the last few 
years, the United States proved unwilling to reduce 
consumption and increase savings while countervail-
ing measures were equally unpalatable to China, Ja-
pan, and other major exporters. A burgeoning current-
account deficit in the United States was matched by 
massive capital inflows, mainly from Asian investors 
and energy producers keen to hold assets denomi-
nated in US dollars. The ground was well prepared for 
disaster, when deregulatory zeal brought on a credit 
boom and a widespread mispricing of risk. 
Iain Begg suggests that regulatory failures were 
among the chief causes of the global financial crisis. 
This failure, he argues, was not restricted to the shad-
ow banking sector but encompassed mainstream and 
conventionally-regulated financial institutions, which 
left themselves under-capitalised in their search for 
more profitable but increasingly risky trading strate-
gies. Banking practices may have added to this prob-
lem, Begg suggests, by allowing bonuses to be award-
ed without exposure to risk or before the true value of 
net purchases or sales could be measured.
For Jacopo Carmassi, Daniel Gros and Stefano 
Micossi, financial practices of this sort were a symp-
tom rather than a cause of excessive credit expan-
sion and investments. Reckless bets on asset-price 
increases, they argue, would not have been possible 
without domestic policy errors in the monetary do-
main. The pursuit of lax monetary policies following 
the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000, the authors 
suggest, added fuel to the fire of the credit boom and 
led a convergence of expectations among investors 
that asset prices would increase indefinitely. Individu-
als underestimated the risks from such behaviour not 
only because of ‘irrational exuberance’ but because 
central bankers in the US, and to a lesser extent in 
Europe, created the misleading impression that mon-
etary policy could ‘mop up’ in the event of an asset-
price correction.
 hese problems were compounded, Carmas-
si, Gros and Micossi argue, by shortcomings in the 
framework for financial regulation and supervision. 
A puzzling feature of the current crisis is that some 
European banks were even less well capitalised than 
their counterparts on Wall Street in spite of the fact 
that financial regulation was deemed to be stricter in 
Europe than in the US. Financial sector leverage, the 
authors show, increased by 70% in the euro area over 
the period 1999-2007 compared with a figure of 40% 
of GDP in the US. A possible explanation is that Eu-
ropean financial institutions interpreted the Basel Ac-
cord’s capital rules in a perverse way, treating mini-
mum capital requirements as a de facto ceiling and 
neglecting broader risk- assessment responsibilities. 
The ad hoc coordination at the EU level and the legiti-
macy challenge
Despite the rather ‘thin’ institutional framework 
for crisis management and resolution in the EU, the 
member states have showed a surprising capacity for 
ad-hoc policy coordination in the midst of the global 
financial crisis. Perhaps the most significant develop-
ment, Pauly argues, has been the ‘quiet development’ 
of emergency fiscal burden sharing mechanisms with-
in the EU in the form of reduced profits flowing from 
central banks back to national treasuries, through the 
balance sheets of multilateral financial institutions, and 
through regional payments facilities. Thus, although 
the European Recovery Plan fell short as a form of ex-
ante burden sharing, solidarity between EU member 
states was not entirely absent. 
Another surprising feature of the EU’s response to 
the financial crisis has been the degree of ad-hoc co-
operation between the UK and euro-area members. 
The highpoint of this cooperation was Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown’s attendance of the emergency summit 
of euro-area heads of state and government in Octo-
ber 2009 to discuss the UK banking rescue plan. The 
summit endorsed Brown’s ideas and it provided a tem-
plate for similar efforts in other EU member states. For 
Lucia Quaglia, the EU’s efforts at coordination in this 
area are an archetypal example of Europeanization in 
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action. Although national interests and priorities were 
at the forefront in policy makers’ mind in responding to 
the crisis, the EU facilitated ‘learning’ (or policy trans-
fer) between member states in their efforts to tackle 
weaknesses in national banking systems. 
Even if the EU helped to avert financial disaster in 
Europe, the crisis, Erik Jones suggests, has taken its 
toll on EMU’s legitimacy. The ECB has responded in a 
sure-footed manner to the financial crisis thus far, he 
notes, but less than half of EU citizens express trust in 
the institution. Similarly, the crisis may have convinced 
authorities in Iceland that the country’s future lies in 
the EU and euro area, but only 39 percent of EU citi-
zens believe that the euro has mitigated the negative 
effects of the crisis. This loss of support for the single 
currency may be temporary, Jones suggests, but it is 
symptomatic of EMU’s legitimacy deficit. In this re-
spect, the financial crisis has confirmed that the ECB 
has limited options available for enhancing the per-
ceived benefits of the euro during a period of height-
ened uncertainty over the economic outlook.
The similarities and differences of national responses 
to the crisis  
Despite some common problems experienced by all 
financial systems worldwide, the turmoil affected vari-
ous countries to a different extent and in different way 
in that the effects of the crisis were filtered by domes-
tic economic and political institutions. Hence, besides 
some shared lines of action, the national responses to 
the turmoil varied even across Europe. Iain Hardie and 
David Howarth consider the impact of the crisis on the 
bank-based models of France and Germany. A striking 
feature of the recent turmoil, they note, is that German 
banks, which have traditionally been seen as more 
conservative and regulated than their French counter-
parts, have incurred significantly greater losses. This 
is due, the authors argue, to the fact that the German 
banking sector has experienced a more dramatic pro-
cess of financialisation in recent years as commercial 
and regional banks have sought to increase profitabil-
ity by increasing risk taking through practices such as 
derivative trading. Ironically, such practices increased 
the vulnerability of German banks to the global finan-
cial crisis as evidenced, for example, by the exposure 
of Landesbank to the US subprime market via asset 
back commercial paper (ABCP) conduits. The German 
government’s response to the financial crisis may slow 
down the process of financialisation but it is unlikely to 
reverse it, raising questions about the fate of the coun-
try’s bank-based model and the role of ‘patient’ capital 
in its particular variety of capitalism. 
Dermot Hodson and Deborah Mabbett ask how 
economic and financial decision-making in the Unit-
ed Kingdom (UK) has been affected by the crisis. UK 
economic policy over the last decade, they argue, 
has been underpinned by a New-Keynesian inspired 
paradigm that prioritised the pursuit of price stability, 
delegated operational responsibility for counter-cycli-
cal monetary policy to the Bank of England and al-
lowed limited scope for fiscal activism. This paradigm 
had limited regard for the linkages between macro-
economic policy and financial stability, as reflected in 
the government’s decision to share responsibility for 
financial crisis management between the Treasury, 
Bank of England and Financial Services Authority. 
The UK’s New Keynesian paradigm is under severe 
strain as a result of the financial crisis. Its credibility 
has been challenged, inter alia, by the failure of mon-
etary policy to prevent a housing bubble from occur-
ring and by the failure of traditional monetary policies 
to make amends after it burst. In spite of these and 
other strains, however, there is little sign of a radical 
reordering of the goals, instruments and institutions of 
UK economic policy of the kind that heralded the de-
mise of Keynesianism and the rise of monetarism in 
the late 1970s.
David Mayes explores the response of Nordic 
countries to the global financial crisis. He finds little 
evidence that the financial crisis experienced by Den-
mark, Finland, Norway and Sweden during the late 
1980s and early 1990s left Nordic countries less vul-
nerable to the effects of the recent financial turmoil 
than other member states. One reason for this fact is 
that the current crisis has a different character than 
those of the late 1980s and 1990s. The increasingly 
cross-border character of banking in Nordic countries, 
for example, made it more difficult for national authori-
ties to mimic the financial rescue packages employed 
twenty years ago. More significant still was the fact that 
past crises did not pave the way for a radically new ap-
proach to financial regulation and supervision in the 
Nordic countries. In Sweden, for example, attempts to 
overhaul rules on bank intervention were not yet fina-
lised at the onset of the global financial crisis, making 
it difficult for national authorities to deal with distressed 
banks. One reason for the slow pace of reform, Mayes 
speculates, is that the comparative success of crisis 
management during the Nordic financial crisis of the 
late 1980s and early 1980s bred complacency about 
the need to boost crisis avoidance policies.
Looking ahead: the debate over regulatory reforms
The Nordic experience shows that significant re-
form is not inevitable after a severe financial crisis. 
Hodson and Mabbett arrive at a similar conclusion in 
their analysis of recent reform proposals in the UK. 
For all the talk of revising or scrapping the UK’s tri-
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partite system of financial crisis management, neither 
the government nor the main opposition party seem 
willing to contemplate a radical overhaul of the aims 
and institutions of UK economic policy. The reason, 
the authors suggest, is that the political constituency 
for imposing counter-cyclical capital requirements is 
simply not there. Nor are politicians willing to consid-
er measures that would put the City of London at a 
competitive disadvantage no matter how much the UK 
may have suffered during the global crisis from its de-
pendence on financial services. 
Carmassi, Gros and Micossi, in contrast, argue 
that reform in Europe might go too far in response to 
the global financial crisis. They warn, in particular, of 
a regulatory backlash by EU policy-makers against 
forms of financial innovation such as securitisation, 
derivatives and hedge funds. Such measures, they 
argue, could both hinder financial markets from pro-
moting growth and investment in the EU and distract 
from the more important task of enhancing the link-
ages between monetary policy and macro-prudential 
supervision. To this end, the authors advocate, inter 
alia, the imposition of stricter capital requirements 
based a definition of total assets that cannot easily be 
circumvented.
Begg critically evaluates the proposals for over-
hauling the EU’s system of financial supervision set 
out in de Larosière report in April 2009. Plans to create 
a European Systemic Risk Council led by the ECB, he 
suggests, are a step in the right direction towards a 
quasi-federal system of financial supervision. Howev-
er, it remains to be seen how national regulators that 
exist separately from national central banks would be 
represented on such a body. He also welcomes plans 
to create a European System of Financial Regulators 
but remains puzzled as to why such a body would not 
be given responsibility for overseeing financial entities 
with substantial cross-border activity. A more funda-
mental weakness in the de Larosière report, Begg ar-
gues, is the failure to address the fiscal underpinnings 
of EU financial supervision. With an EU tax an unlikely 
prospect, significant doubts exist about the credibility 
of EU supervision and the arrangements for burden 
sharing in the event that a systemic crisis occurs.
Conclusion
The EU and its member states are, it would ap-
pear, slowly recovering from the global financial crisis 
and so is the global economy. Several jurisdictions, 
including the EU, have engaged to a different extent 
and with different degrees of success in the revision of 
the existing framework for financial services regulation 
and supervision. The EU, under the advocacy of some 
member states, has also pushed for stricter and more 
extensive regulation of several financial activities in in-
ternational fora, first and foremost the G-20. The glob-
al financial crisis seems to have somewhat increased 
the international regulatory power of the EU in the in-
ternational arena, where in the past the USA tended to 
play a predominant role. Indeed, the crisis has been 
seen by many in the EU – rightly or wrongly – as a fail-
ure of the Anglo-Saxon model of financial capitalism 
and ‘light touch’ regulation. Whether the ‘right’ lessons 
from the crisis have been learnt by the EU remains to 
be seen. The crisis has, however, already provided an 
opportunity to discuss and revisit some key debates in 
European political economy, highlighting some of the 
fundamental weaknesses and unexpected sources of 
resilience in European economic governance.
Dermot Hodson, University of London
Lucia Quaglia University of Sussex
Note
1 Lucia Quaglia wishes to thank the European Re-
search Council (Grant 204398 FINGOVEU) for finan-
cial support for this research. The usual disclaimer ap-
plies.
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EUSA Teaching the EU 
Interest Section Reports
Making the European Union Relevant 
to all Students
Alexander Caviedes
there is little more gratifying than receiving a commu-
nication from a former student recounting how what 
they learned in your class is being confirmed now that 
they have the opportunity to visit Europe. However, 
many students never visit Europe, much less ever 
leave the US. Much has been written about simula-
tions and how they make the EU concrete to students 
(Kaunert 2009). However, this piece asks the ques-
tion of how to make learning about the EU relevant 
and valuable for all students? It does so by exploring 
a trio of important strategies, one that allows students 
to enter into the subject matter quickly, a second that 
attracts their attention, and a third that provides them 
with general knowledge that will stay with them. 
Using Theory to teach about European Diversity
The ideal student of the EU would have some fa-
miliarity with Europe and perhaps even European poli-
tics, but a EU politics course is not always linked to a 
‘European Politics’ prerequisite. While students stand 
to learn a fair share about countries such as France 
and the UK as the course progresses, for students who 
know little about any European country, it is important 
to grant them a sense of European diversity from the 
outset. Rather than exploring individual countries and 
their characteristics, it is worth recognizing that EU pol-
itics often revolves around competing attitudes about 
political economy and social policy. One can prepare 
students for the cleavages that will recur throughout 
the course by introducing them to differences in variet-
ies of capitalism or the worlds of welfare.
While the predominant framework for comparing 
European political economies is Hall and Soskice’s 
‘varieties of capitalism,’ the differences between coor-
dinated and liberal market economies rest upon fairly 
advanced understandings and somewhat abstract con-
cepts of political economy. Undergraduates may find 
it easier to read Michel Albert’s Capitalism vs. Capi-
talism (1993), which highlights the differences within 
Europe on a variety of different issues ranging from 
income equality, to regulation, to sources of finance 
(banks vs. brokers). This lends itself nicely to dividing 
the class into different discussion groups, each focus-
ing on a separate issue, which must present that issue 
to the rest of the class together with an assessment as 
to which type (Rhenish vs. Anglo-Saxon) prevails in 
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the one country they know best: the US. 
One particular facet of diversity that Albert touches 
upon is explored more deeply in Esping-Andersen’s 
1990 classic on the welfare state. As Lahodynsky 
observes (2007), US students appear increasingly 
critical of the limited nature of social transfers in the 
US. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism features 
charts and indicators on welfare programs from which 
students can be asked to identify three different group-
ings of social expenditure, within which the US is also 
situated for purposes of comparison. While the worlds 
of welfare are less recurrent than varieties of capital-
ism within later discussions of the nature of the single 
market, they still serve as a powerful lesson as to the 
diversity that exists in Europe, as well as the most 
common types of country groupings (for instance, the 
high taxation/high social spending Scandinavians).
For students who are often unsure about their abil-
ity to contribute to class discussion due to insufficient 
specific knowledge about European countries, a quick 
primer in the types of European economies can lend 
confidence as well as familiarity when these issues re-
surface later in the course.
Making the EU relevant to American students
Some students are naturally drawn to new experi-
ences and unfamiliar locales, but for many whose ex-
perience and interest is limited to the US, generating 
interest in the EU first involves convincing them that 
the EU is relevant to the US and their own personal 
welfare. To further students’ confidence in their ability 
to understand, the US can serve as an implicit or even 
explicit reference point for comparison (as mentioned 
above in the case of welfare systems, where students 
often feel sobered to see so many other countries af-
fording more generous benefits). Any discussion of 
EU institutions is best begun with the question of what 
the different branches of government are in the US, 
and what functions they serve. For most students, this 
is an opportunity to ground themselves in what they 
know before exploring institutions that have unfamiliar 
names and somewhat confusing competences, from 
an American perspective. 
In deciding which EU policy areas are most rel-
evant to American students, one may want to consider 
which are implicated most by transatlantic relations. 
Among EU textbooks, McCormick’s The European 
Union: politics and policies, is written explicitly with 
the US undergraduate in mind. While it covers fewer 
policy areas than other texts, the ones it does focus 
on are indicative of those which are easiest to link to 
potential points of contention between the US and EU: 
agricultural policy, external trade, and foreign and se-
curity policy. Similar to Lahodynksy’s findings (2007), 
my students are amazed at the perceived ‘audacity’ 
of the Commission to impose fines or meddle in the 
affairs of American multinationals such as Microsoft or 
Boeing in the name of fostering competition. 
While it can be challenging to get students to ap-
preciate the extra-territorial implications of EU policy in 
realms such as trade, students possess some familiar-
ity with US foreign policy, so this is one area in which 
students can be expected to wield examples from the 
US to compare with EU tactics and policies. Unlike the 
discussion of competition or trade policy, which would 
benefit from scaffolding so that students first under-
stand US policy in these areas, American undergradu-
ates not only know about US foreign policy, but have 
usually developed their own opinions on the subject. 
Especially for students who are somewhat critical of 
US policy, the study of the EU provides them not only 
with a critique but a concrete, albeit underdeveloped, 
alternative.
If the comparison of some EU policies (such as se-
curity) to those of nation-states sometimes leaves the 
students with an impression of relative impotence, one 
area where students can gain respect for the EU is 
in its environmental policy. In particular, a direct com-
parison of the carbon emissions reduction obligations 
of, and actual reductions achieved by, the EU or its 
member states to those of the U.S. or Canada should 
leave students curious. Since the debate over climate 
control in the U.S. centers on the high costs of reduc-
ing emissions under the successor to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, how have fellow industrialized countries like the 
UK, Germany, France, and Sweden been able to meet 
their pledged emissions targets? Thanks to its homo-
geneous membership, the EU provides an example of 
how more technologically advanced and industrialized 
countries can partner with developing or transition-
ing countries that are able to exchange their surplus 
carbon credits (since they emit less carbon) for the 
technology to produce their energy with diminished 
environmental impact. Clearly, this is the direction that 
the U.S. will have to follow with regard to China and 
India if any advances are to be made in the direction 
of a truly global regime, so the EU provides a ready-
made blueprint.
The EU may not have a very established system 
of welfare policies when compared to those of the in-
dividual member states, but focus on social policy still 
provides a relevant moment of comparison and con-
trast if one can bring in the health policy, unemploy-
ment insurance, or maternity leave provisions of some 
individual member states. The United States of Europe 
(Reid 2005), a wonderfully accessible view of Europe 
from the perspective of an American journalist, is full 
of explicit and implicit comparisons to the U.S. A par-
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ticularly eye opening chapter is that on the European 
social model that leaves students questioning whether 
universal health care really is beyond the U.S.’s ability, 
why students pay so much to attend college, and how 
a society that is so focused on family values offers so 
little in terms of maternity leave or child-care. Even if 
EU policies cannot be as directly implicated by such a 
discussion, it performs the equally relevant task of de-
lineating what is meant by the term: ‘European social 
model,’ and why this element of identity still differenti-
ates Europe from the U.S.
Teaching the EU as an Economy
American students often suffer from the belief that 
all economies function like that of the United States. 
For example, American (mis-)use of the word ‘liber-
al,’ to describe those who the rest of the world labels 
as ‘socialist’ or ‘social democratic,’ invites confusion 
when students are confronted with the word liberal to 
describe the economic model of the US (Cox 1993, 
70). As a trading bloc rather than a country, the EU 
may be viewed as sui generis, yet it still represents 
an economy that can be paralleled with national mod-
els. Disaggregating the various elements necessary to 
constitute a market - through the study of the process 
of how they are/were constructed and regulated in the 
case of the EEC - is quite an eye-opener to students 
that too often assume that a market functions auto-
matically.
By discussing the regulatory framework necessary 
to create a single currency or maintain agricultural pol-
icy, students quickly appreciate the amount of govern-
ment intervention involved in overseeing the economy. 
Exposing the politics behind the implementation of 
competition policy, or in conducting international trade, 
awakens students to the reality that in these areas US 
policy often lies quite a distance from the free-trading 
ideal that it projects.
While the structure of American undergraduate 
education may gift classrooms with a greater diver-
sity of understanding and academic preparation, this 
can also mean that many of our students have modest 
groundings in politics and none in economics. For this 
reason, it is helpful to think of an EU politics course 
as something of a general course in political economy 
from which the students may emerge not simply with 
an understanding of how the EU functions (which they 
may forget after a short time for lack of continued ex-
posure), but with an ability to recognize the key com-
ponents of political economy and the tools available 
for governments to influence the economy. More than 
ever, students are confronted with the debate over the 
proper role of government with regard to the economy. 
A course in EU politics that devotes attention to the 
foundations of political economy can provide students 
with the tools to evaluate their own government’s per-
formance – an essential civic skill that they should re-
tain even after individual facts concerning the EU itself 
begin to fade with time.
Good teachers must possess a passion for their 
subject. Molding good students also requires such en-
thusiasm, and hopefully this article lends some insight 
as to how to foster this. Theory enables students to 
quickly understand what is at stake in debates over 
European integration, even if they have little knowl-
edge of Europe. Using the U.S. as a contrasting ex-
ample, or focusing on policies that affect the U.S., 
should help the course resonate with the interests of 
American students, especially those with little interest 
in international affairs. Finally, while one cannot al-
ways elicit excitement for the subject matter, by teach-
ing the workings of an economy, particularly a care-
fully crafted one such as the EU’s, will serve students 
in the long run since they will have the tools to discern 
and possibly contribute to the workings of their own 
country’s political economy.
Alexander Caviedes, SUNY Fredonia
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Teaching EU Policies to Engineering Students
Attilio Stajano
the turnout at the European Parliament elections in 
June 2009 was at 43.1%, the lowest value ever, 9 to 43 
percentage points below the turnout in the most recent 
national political elections in the 27 member states and 
plummeting to about 20% in Slovakia and Lithuania. 
Causes of the electorate’s indifference include the fo-
cusing on local issues of the national political leaders 
in the EP campaign; the inability of the EU institutions 
to inform the European citizens on what benefits EU 
legislation and EU policies can really bring to them; 
and the inadequacy of national educational programs 
in preparing youngsters to European citizenship. 
I started teaching on research and technology EU 
policies initially in the U.S., at Georgia Tech (in 1999), 
and later on in Italy and Belgium; my audience was 
mainly graduate students in engineering.  To my sur-
prise, European students were so unfamiliar with EU 
principles and values, let alone EU legislation and 
policies, as the American ones.  I decided that I could 
not teach about EU research and technology policies 
without first building awareness in the students of their 
belonging in a community larger than their home coun-
try and of the role of the internal market in establish-
ing new rules-of-the-game in business, in trade, and in 
their future profession in Europe and beyond. 
Courses on the EU are usually offered in faculties 
of Political Science, schools of Law, or departments of 
Economics.  My courses, instead, were conceived, de-
signed, and offered in the Faculty of Engineering to an 
audience of graduate students in Telecommunications, 
Computer Science, and Electronics.  The courses ad-
dress the intersection between research policy and 
industrial policy, covering policies aimed to increasing 
competitiveness of the European productive system. 
Since the audience is not familiar with the principles 
and values that unite European citizens, or with EU 
institutional structure and policies, the courses include 
an introduction to the EU foundations, structure and 
policies, focusing on policies for sustainable develop-
ment.  My students are not expecting and don’t need a 
course on political science.  Rather they need to know 
how the transformations in economy resulting from the 
belonging of their country in an enlarging EU affect 
the business environment in which their profession will 
develop.  For this reason, as opposed to a scholarly 
approach, my courses have a pragmatic one, combin-
ing a bottom-up description of how business reacts to 
the changing environment with a structured presenta-
tion of the relevant policies.
My aim is to make students aware that Europe-
an citizens belong in the wide European Community, 
highlighting the evolution of the European society as it 
is transformed by technology, globalization, intercon-
nections, and by the institutional evolution of the EU. 
Future European engineers learn how the EU supports 
competitiveness of domestic companies to achieve 
sustainable economic growth.  They are introduced to 
the EU business environment, the implications of in-
ternal market, competition policy, the Lisbon strategy, 
and other policies that affect their profession.  
EU is presented as a region with high labor costs 
that cannot compete internationally on the basis of 
price.  Investments in education, lifelong learning, re-
search, and innovation are proved to be necessary 
for EU member states to face the strong competition 
within the Triad and with the emerging economies.  EU 
must offer superior products and services so that cus-
tomers are prepared to pay the extra cost, attracted 
by the quality edge of EU products.  The EU research, 
innovation, and technology policies, are presented as 
a contribution to the achievement of greater competi-
tiveness and sustainable growth of the EU economy 
within the context of a knowledge-based society.  It is 
shown that they also contribute to cohesion and to the 
implementation of other policies: Competition, Con-
sumer Protection, Employment, Energy, Enlargement, 
Enterprise, Environment, Information Society, Institu-
tional Affairs, Internal Market, Mobility, Public Health, 
Regional Policy, and Transport. 
I have been involved with the use of technology 
in teaching since the early 1970s, when e-learning 
was called ‘computers assisted learning’ and the most 
advanced tools in the classroom were typewriter-type 
terminals.  In my teaching I now make extensive use 
of asynchronous e-learning; along an approach I de-
veloped following an inspiring experience at the Uni-
versity of Georgia at Athens, GA, based on the works 
by Palloff [Palloff et al. 1999, 2001].  My use of e-learn-
ing is meant to create a community in which students 
play an active role interacting with one another and 
with the lecturer, and contributing to the creation of 
content, knowledge, know-how, and skills. The learn-
ing community is based on the extension of face-to-
face lectures with an asynchronous online interaction 
meant to involve active, intense, regular, and moni-
tored participation by students. 
The online asynchronous interaction uses various 
tools, including forums that induce active participation 
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and enable the lecturer to monitor the involvement of 
each individual student.  The forums include: 
 
• a forum to post comments and ask for clari-
fication
• a forum addressing the question of the 
week, a question posted by the lecturer at the be-
ginning of each week, related to the week’s sub-
ject or to upcoming events in the EU institutions  
• a forum to post questions for a regular 
weekly question time session. Questions are post-
ed before or after the session and receive an ex-
tensive answer by the lecturer, later posted on the 
platform
I use an open-source platform of the University of 
Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, hosted by Dokeos (http://
www.dokeos.com./hosting.php), a service company in 
Belgium run by the architect of the e-learning platform, 
Dr. Thomas De Praetere. The user interface is par-
ticularly easy to use and the platform is continuously 
improved based on the sharing of some of the devel-
opments commissioned by users.
The use of the e-learning platform in my courses 
has been designed to:
• ensure the utmost involvement of each stu-
dent 
• create the conditions for the creation of 
content and knowledge by the students to comple-
ment the role played by the lecturer 
• create an online learning community, giv-
ing a voice to less extroverted and more reflective 
students who would not participate in classroom 
discussions 
• continue the classroom discussions through 
asynchronous online communication 
• ensure a strong interaction with and be-
tween students 
• let students introduce themselves and de-
scribe the reasons why they have enrolled and 
their expectations about the course 
• structure asynchronous discussions in 
several forums on topics suggested both by the 
lecturer and by the students 
Students are encouraged to give answers to other 
students’ questions; the lecturer monitors the forum 
and intervenes when appropriate to complete ―and 
correct if necessary― the posted answers.  Students 
should be able to rely on timely answers to their ques-
tions.  In addition to the classroom hours, students are 
supposed to devote up to 12 hours a week for self 
study and asynchronous interaction on the e-learning 
platform.
The e-learning platform enables to trace students’ 
activity and participation, allowing intervening timely 
on students that are inactive or not sufficiently in-
volved.  It offers also many other tools, including self-
assessment tests and a way to document the course 
progress.  Each lecture is documented, with an exten-
sively commented copy of the slides and with home 
assignments and pointers to recommended reading 
made available on line.
The lecturer is supposed to spend quite some time 
on the e-learning platform.  My own experience would 
suggest that, in order to serve 25 students, 4 hours a 
day are needed on each day of the week (often including 
time over the week end).  Beyond 25 students a tutor for 
each additional 20 students is needed.  Maximum work-
able class size is 60 (with two tutors).  My faculty hired 
Ph.D. students as tutors on the basis of 20 hours per 
week contracts.
A very important part of the courses is the develop-
ment, presentation, and discussion by students of a re-
search paper.  Groups of up to four students write and 
present a research paper on a subject of their choice 
among those suggested by the lecturer or proposed by 
the authoring team and approved by the lecturer, within 
topics addressed in the course.  Every student is also 
the discussant of a paper of another group.  Each stu-
dent should allocate up to 24 hours to this activity.  The 
choice of the research paper subject is finalized within 
the first three weeks of the course, as soon as students 
are well familiar with the way the course is structured and 
conducted.  Examples of research paper titles: “EU R&D 
on Renewable Energies”, “Brain Drain”, “Should Turkey 
Become a Full EU Member?”, “The Recovery of the Finn-
ish Economy in the Early 1990s”.
Through the writing of the research paper students 
contribute to the educational process by offering original 
content not included in the lectures and in the textbook. 
They show their ability to work in group, to seek infor-
mation independently, to process that information criti-
cally, and to defend their argumentations. Furthermore, 
they develop their written and oral reporting and debating 
skills.
The research paper is an original extension of the 
content of the course.  It contributes to the course objec-
tives by one or several of these means:
• to present and defend a thesis contrary to 
one proposed by the lecturer
• to extend a topic covered in the course
• to introduce a relevant topic not covered in 
the course
The research paper is not a ‘cut and paste’ of materi-
als downloaded from the web or a survey, but rather the 
presentation of a thesis and its justification.  Its size is 
strictly contained in 10 pages and does not exceed 3,500 
16     Fall 2009  EUSA Review
words.  The subject of the research paper is explicitly an-
chored to a lecture or to a section of the textbook.  Each 
student is in charge of studying the paper produced by 
another group and to animate the discussion with perti-
nent and challenging questions.  In addition, everyone 
can ask questions at the presentation of any paper.
Over the years the syllabus of the course (now on 
line at http://stajano.deis.unibo.it/LINKS/syl.htm) evolved 
into a book [Stajano 2009] whose second edition was 
published in 2009 by Springer.  An appendix and an ac-
companying website ―available at http://stajano.deis.
unibo.it/RQC.htm ― contain ancillary distance-learning 
material, extended readings, country-specific data, im-
ages, figures, tables, and other materials for producing 
course notes and visuals.
Over the years about 500 students attended 18 edi-
tions of this course in classes of various sizes in three 
different campuses.  Students’ evaluations were consis-
tently more favorable than the faculty’s average on the 
interest raised, the use of tools, the completeness and 
availability of documentation, and the availability of the 
lecturer to tutor them.  They also reported a perceived 
high work load.
In conclusion, I think this course was useful and 
successful and I am convinced that teaching about the 
EU should be proposed in European universities also 
beyond the curricula of political science, law, and eco-
nomics, adapting the tune to the context and to the in-
terests and needs of the audience.  It might be a small 
contribution to a great cause: increasing in the young EU 
citizens the feeling of belonging in the European Union 
and raising their awareness of the impact of EU actions 
on their lives; and ―maybe― increasing in the long term 
the turnout in EP elections.
Attilio Stajano, University of Bologna
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Simon Hix. What’s Wrong With the European Union 
& How to Fix It. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008.
there has been a growing literature, after the French 
and Dutch referenda, in 2005, on EU malaise. A part 
of that literature has stressed the constitutional origins 
of the malaise, arguing that the EU will not overcome 
its difficulties without settling its constitutional founda-
tions. Another part of that literature has suggested that 
EU difficulties come from political instead of structural 
sources, i.e. from the nature of the political process. 
Simon Hix’s book squarely belongs to this latter inter-
pretation. The first half, What’s Wrong With the EU, 
develops the argument that the EU needs more par-
tisan politics and not another cycle of treaty reform. 
For Simon Hix, the EU’s difficulties are due to the 
policy gridlock which tends to emerge from the inter-
actions between the three governmental institutions 
(the Commission, the Council and the Parliament), 
from the declining level of its popular legitimacy and 
from the democratically unaccountable character of its 
decision-making process. Indeed, the EU is consid-
ered to be closer to a form of “enlightened despotism” 
(whatever this means) than to a “genuine” democracy. 
The EU has already become “less consensual” and 
“more majoritarian” in institutional terms, due to the 
reforms introduced since the Single European Act.  
What it needs, thus, is a transformation of elite and 
mass behavioural patterns to correspond to the institu-
tional changes that have already taken place. The EU 
needs more “open” debate and a “true” competition 
over the exercise of political authority in order to guar-
antee its citizens an influence over the EU agenda. In 
addition, “more” politics entails allowing coalitions to 
be built across institutions in order to overcome the 
constraints of the system of checks and balances built 
into the EU governmental system. Certainly, the EU 
will never be like a Westminster model of government 
(where a plurality of voters creates a party majority 
in the parliament that is able to control the totality of 
the decision-making process). Rather, the EU should 
become like the model of government in Germany, 
the Benelux countries or Scandinavia, where a large, 
broad coalition is built in support of policy change via 
an “open” and “vigorous” political debate. 
The second part of the book, How to Fix It explains 
brilliantly the many changes that can be made imme-
diately to promote a “limited democratic politics” in the 
EU, such as requiring trans-European political parties 
to indicate their candidate for the position of Commis-
EUSA Review    Fall 2009   17 
sion president during the elections for the European 
parliament, adopting winner-takes-more rules for al-
locating institutional roles within the latter, or soliciting 
more transparency for the deliberation process tak-
ing place within the Council of Ministers. In sum, for 
Simon Hix, the EU needs more political competition 
at all institutional levels, in order to create cross-insti-
tutional partisan coalitions along the lines of the left-
right divide. This would help citizens to understand the 
stakes of the decision-making process taking place in 
Brussels and thereby increase their participation in the 
EU political process.
Simon Hix’s book is not aimed at an academic au-
dience, but mainly at the larger public. For this reason, 
the concepts utilized are vague (i.e. “enlightened des-
potism”) and the argument is overloaded with adjec-
tives (“genuine”, “open”, “true”) and adverbs (“more”, 
“less”). Certainly, Hix has demonstrated with previ-
ous academic books, and in particular the acclaimed 
The Political System of the European Union, that he 
knows, the structure and functioning of the EU as few 
other scholars do.  Although he was one of the first 
scholars to promote a comparative perspective on the 
EU, here he falls into the trap of so many EU studies: 
the impressionistic comparison of the EU institutional 
structure. How can the EU become like Germany, the 
“Benelux countries” (there are significant differences 
between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) 
or the Scandinavian countries? The EU is a union of 
states organized around a separation of powers and 
checks and balances, whereas the latter countries are 
fusion-of-power systems and each functions along dif-
ferent democratic logics (Belgium is a consociational/ 
consensual democracy, which is not properly the case 
in Germany, Scandinavia or the Netherlands). More-
over, Belgium and Germany are two federal systems, 
whereas Sweden or the Netherlands are not: and this 
certainly influence the way in which government coali-
tions are built in the two cases. Models of democracy 
cannot be defined through adverbs (“more” or “less” 
consensual or majoritarian), but through the parsimo-
nious identification of institutional features. 
Although Simon Hix is aware that the EU cannot 
be coherently “parliamentarized”, he seems to have 
difficulty in identifying the properties of the democratic 
process in a non-parliamentary political system. At the 
end of day, the basic solution for the EU’s malaise—
even for Hix—resides in a stricter connection between 
the majority in the European parliament and the par-
tisan composition of the Commission. Indeed, unions 
of asymmetrical states cannot accommodate similar 
“political” solutions. Their democratic process can, 
and should, be politicized, but such politicization will 
have to take place according to a different logic. With-
out a precise understanding of the EU’s institutional 
structures, the reformers’ dreams, whether based on 
a constitutional or a political interpretation of the EU’s 
difficulties, will have a limited future. Probably, it would 
be advisable that the scholars of the EU investigate 
more precisely also the institutions and the functioning 
of the other established democratic systems. 
Sergio Fabbrini, University of Torino
David Judge and David Earnshaw. The European 
Parliament. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
since david judge and david earnshaw’s The European 
Parliament’s first edition was published in 2003, there 
have been exciting developments in Europe that are 
of historical significance.  With the accession of twelve 
new member states, the European Union (EU) ex-
panded from 15 to 27 countries comprising a popula-
tion of almost 500 million people.  The internal institu-
tional development of the European Parliament (EP) 
has paralleled the growth of the Union, and today the 
EP membership increased to 736 with a subsequent 
increase in ideological and linguistic diversity. 
The breadth and pace of change on the European 
continent has mandated a revised second edition of 
the book. Remaining faithful to the basic structure and 
spirit of the first edition, the central argument of the 
book is also the same: The European Parliament is 
not sui generis and should be understood as a legisla-
ture that performs various “universal” legislative func-
tions within the EU’s broader institutional structure. 
The added value of this second edition is the inclu-
sion of the 2004 European Parliament elections fol-
lowing the European Union’s (EU) “big bang” eastern 
enlargement, further EU expansion towards Roma-
nia and Bulgaria in 2007, internal organizational and 
procedural changes within the EP, and the changes 
to the EP’s powers resulting from the Lisbon Treaty. 
But more importantly, the second edition draws on the 
recent studies on the EP published in the last two or 
three years. 
After a brief introduction, the book is divided into 
nine chapters.  In the first chapter, Judge and Earn-
shaw set themselves a rather ambitious task of locat-
ing an institution that is widely perceived as sui generis 
in wider models of legislatures and of the EU’s system 
of governance.  And they do so successfully.  The sec-
ond chapter complements the comparative analysis 
with a rather too long historical review to better under-
stand how the EP’s location as a legislature changed 
across time (66). The following two chapters deal with 
the broader issues of legitimation, linkage and repre-
sentation.  Chapter 3 discusses why “a simple linear 
model of parliamentary legitimation” has proved inap-
propriate in the EU context and points to the multi-
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ple “foci of legitimation” (88). Developing further the 
analysis of linkage, Chapter 4 looks at the “what” and 
“how” of representation.  That is, it considers what is to 
be represented or the “foci of representation” and how 
representatives “act on behalf of others” (111).
Moving inside the EP, the fifth and sixth chapters 
examine EP’s internal institutional structures: party 
groups, committees, and rules of procedure. In the next 
two chapters, the authors provide a detailed overview 
of the EP’s relations with other EU institutions. Chap-
ter 7 describes EP’s formal powers whereas Chapter 8 
moves beyond these descriptions and analyzes the in-
direct influence of the EP within the EU. And, the book 
ends with a discussion on parliamentary democracy at 
the EU level. 
As the European Union looks ahead to the Lisbon 
Treaty, the revised second edition of the European 
Parliament represents a welcome addition to the bur-
geoning literature on democracy, representation, and 
legitimacy in the European Union.  The book also 
makes a valuable contribution to the contentious de-
bate about the parliamentarization of the EU.  Despite 
dissenting voices and failure scenarios, the authors 
strongly believe in representative democracy and view 
the EP as the answer to the EU’s legitimacy and de-
mocracy problems.  
The strength of the book lies not only in its theo-
retical and empirical contributions but also in the ques-
tions it raises about the future of democracy in the EU. 
This is certainly an indispensable reference book for 
anyone engaged in research on the EP, but it will also 
be useful for those concerned about the constitutional 
issues facing the European Union.  While the concepts 
might not be accessible to a non-specialist, the book is 
highly recommended to academics and graduate stu-
dents of comparative politics.  
Gaye Gungor, European University Institute
Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak (eds.). Opposing 
Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscep-
ticism Volume 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak (eds.). Opposing 
Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscep-
ticism Volume 2: Comparative and Theoretical Per-
spectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
euroskepticism, however one defines it, is a relatively 
recent phenomenon—at least insofar as its ability to 
register a consequential impact around “Europe,” the 
bloc of nation states that count themselves as Mem-
ber States of the European Union (EU).  Long consid-
ered an outsider perspective of cranks and crackpots, 
large-scale opposition to European integration has 
gone mainstream in recent years.
Upon the double demise of what we now refer to 
as the Lisbon Treaty—first going down for the count 
at the hands of majorities in France and the Nether-
lands when known as the Constitutional Treaty, and 
more recently at the hands of the ornery Irish—fringe 
candidates have increasingly gotten elected to the Eu-
ropean Parliament.  Indeed, it has long been tempting 
to mock European elites for their automatic assump-
tion that the treaty would inevitably become European 
law (ironically, thanks to the U.S., Europeans now look 
likely to get Lisbon, for the U.S.-generated financial 
crisis that wrought Iceland’s financial meltdown seems 
to have convinced Ireland to cast its lot with continen-
tal partners after all).
In the midst of this gallimaufry arrives a timely set 
of paired volumes by an elite group of European schol-
ars, edited by Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak. 
They set for themselves not so much an ambitious ex-
planatory task as a large-scale project of first produc-
ing an empirical volume of Euroskepticism studies and 
then a companion volume comprising analyses of the 
role political parties play in this phenomenon.  In hard 
cover form, they make for quite a handful not to men-
tion a heavy briefcase. 
Taggart and Szczerbiak take aim at filling an impor-
tant gap in the literature on Euroskepticism, viz. a lack 
of comparative work on the subject and few volumes 
that conduct a thorough mapping exercise.  They aim 
to produce a volume that “systematically compares 
Euroskepticism in different contexts,” as well as one 
that succeeds in its conceptualization of the phenom-
enon.  The question is not so much whether they suc-
ceed in meeting their aims—indeed, they do—rather 
whether the editors should have aimed higher.
The editors employ a dichotomous approach that 
differentiates “hard” from “soft” Euroskepticism:  the 
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former defined as “principled opposition to the EU” 
connoting either opposition to membership or to the 
entire project of European integration, the latter as 
“qualified opposition to the EU” connoting either spe-
cific policy opposition or being opposed to the current 
overall trajectory of the EU. Political parties function 
as the unit of analysis, and the two types of EU oppo-
sition are viewed as resting on a continuum with cer-
tain parties moving back and forth between them—a 
framework adopted by the volumes’ contributors.
The case studies are large in number at 18 and all 
told quite comprehensive, from which several trends 
are clear:  soft Euroskepticism is dominant over in-
stances of its hard counterpart; few traditional or 
“mainstream” parties fit into either category; and Euro-
skeptical parties tend to be small in size and peripheral 
in impact.  The overall collage is a diverse one, made 
of fine texture.  Beyond the nuanced conceptualiza-
tions of Euroskepticism and the identification of some 
intriguing trends across the cases, still one wonders 
whether a more ambitious project may have been war-
ranted.
The difficulty of these volumes lies in their being 
somewhat devoid of theory and fairly thin on causal 
arguments.  Most of the argumentation involves pur-
suit of a viable conceptualization, with the contribu-
tors collectively aiming for “stimulating further debate 
and alternative conceptulatizations.”  However, while 
“mapping” efforts succeed in serving up myriad thick 
descriptions of an intrinsically important phenomenon, 
what causal and theoretical purchase do they pro-
vide?  
The contributors spar largely about definitions and 
categorizations, instead of zeroing in on what explains 
Euroskepticism—casting it as a dependent variable—
or what Euroskeptism helps explain—casting it as an 
independent variable.  To their credit, the second vol-
ume compensates somewhat for the absence of ei-
ther in the first, yet even where causal arguments are 
made the examination of evidence against competing 
hypotheses is often elusive (as is the measurement of 
trends over time).
Moreover, with such an array of survey data avail-
able one wonders why the majority of studies employ 
qualitative methodological techniques instead of quan-
titative ones.  The absence of econometric analyses is 
tangible, in particular categorical analysis using Maxi-
mum Likelihood Estimation (MLE).  With the excep-
tion of Schmitt and van der Eijk, who choose to esti-
mate their data with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
it is something of a missed opportunity for combining 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies.  
Katz employs statistical techniques that provide 
for some intriguing illustrations, though full blown re-
gressions might have pushed the conclusions further, 
and Lees is more theoretical than most, employing 
Political Opportunity Structure theory (yet finding it 
wanting). All of these reside in Volume 2, as Volume 1 
tends to lack explanatory arguments.  Volume 2 gets 
at causation more impressively, featuring independent 
variables like institutional structure, strategy, ideology, 
and interests of party members—the editors settle on 
a combination of the latter two causes—though the 
volume gives short shrift to the importance of public 
opinion in lieu of focusing predominantly on parties.
With Volume 2 being the more analytical of the pair, 
it is not altogether clear why two volumes are neces-
sary.  A single volume may have been more advanta-
geous, beginning with postulating a theory-based ar-
gument followed by case studies comprising evidence 
in confirmation (or not) of the argument.  Yet, taking on 
Katz’s important criticisms, the editors end up refining 
their hard-soft conceptualization in Volume 2 with a 
key nuance.
Beyond any doubt, both volumes succeed in pull-
ing together an impressive array of highly regarded 
scholars.  In light of how important the object of their 
collective study is, one would have enjoyed being a 
fly on the wall of their presumably spirited discussions 
of ideas, concepts, classifications, measurement, and 
the like.  Moreover, there is a distinctive richness to the 
intentionally descriptive studies, for a wealth of intrigu-
ing empirical detail comes across in luxuriant fashion 
in the case study chapters.
Beyond any doubt, the two volumes accomplish 
what they set out to accomplish.  They will help fill the 
targeted gap in the literature; all against a backdrop of 
the Lisbon Treaty’s heralded struggles to become law. 
One is merely left wondering whether the aim could 
have been higher. 
Jeff Stacey, Tulane University
EUSA members interested in reviewing re-
cent EU-related books, please contact the 
reviews editor:
Dr. Amie Kreppel
Center for European Studies
3324 Turlington Hall PO 117342
University of Florida
Gainesville Florida 32611-7342, USA
  Kreppel@ces.ufl.edu
Publishers should send two review copies 
of books directly to Dr. Kreppel.
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2010 EUSA Haas Fund Fellowship Competition 
The 2009-2011 EUSA Executive Committee is pleased to announce the 2010 EUSA Haas Fund 
Fellowship Competition, an annual fellowship for graduate student EU-related dissertation research. 
Thanks entirely to contributions to our Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies, launched in June 
2003 to honor the memory of the late scholar Ernst B. Haas (1924-2003) we will offer at least one 
unrestricted fellowship of $1,500 to support the dissertation research of any graduate student pursu-
ing an EU-related dissertation topic in the academic year 2010-2011.
The selection committee consists of:
- Adrienne Héritier, Chair (European University Institute)
- Craig Parsons (University of Oregon)
- Berthold Rittberger (University of Mannheim)
Please note the following stipulations for applicants, who must:
• be pursuing the doctoral degree (PhD) at an accredited institution in any country;
• be writing a dissertation in English;
• have an EU-related, doctoral dissertation topic approved by the professor who will supervise it; and,
• be able to demonstrate clearly the relevance to EU studies of the dissertation topic. 
Applicants for this Fellowship should submit:
(1) A one-page letter of application that specifies how the fellowship would be used;
(2) A CV;
(3) A two-page (500 words) précis of the dissertation re¬search project that also explains its rel-
evance to EU studies; and,
(4) Ask for two letters of support to be sent directly to EUSA. These letters should be from professors 
serv¬ing on the student’s dissertation committee, and one should be the chair.
Please send applications to eusa@pitt.edu and use the heading “2010 E.B. Haas Fund Fellowship 
competition.” The firm deadline for applications to be received in the EUSA office is January 8, 2010. 
The successful applicant will be notified by March 1, 2010 at the latest, and will receive the grant 
soon thereafter. The fellowship will be paid in one lump sum by check and in US dollars only.
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Congratulations to 2009 EUSA Award Winners
EUSA Award for Lifetime Achievement in European Studies
    Philippe C. Schmitter
EUSA Public Service Award in European Studies
    Ruth Mitchell-Pitts, Executive Director of the European Union Center of 
Excellence, 
                University of North Carolina
EUSA Award for the best book published in 2007 or 2008
     Fabio Franchino. 2007. The Powers of the Union: Delegation in the EU. 
Cambridge: Cambridge 
                 University Press.
 Honorable mention:
      Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland. 2007. Democratic Politics 
in the European 
                  Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
EUSA Award for the Best Dissertation defended in 2007 or 2008
                  Alexandra Hennessy. Economic Interests, Domestic Constraints, and 
the Creation of a European         Single Pension Market. Ph.D. 
Dissertation Boston University.
 Honorable mention:
      Umut Aydin. From Competition to Cooperation: Subsidies in the United 
States, Canada and  
      the European Union. Ph.D. Dissertation University of Washington.
EUSA Award for the Best Paper presented at the 2007 EUSA conference
      Tom Delreux (University of Leuven). "The EU as a Negotiator in Multi-
lateral Chemicals                Negotiations: Multiple Principals, 
Different Agents."
 Honorable mention: 
       Alexandra Hennessy (Clarkson University). "Cheap Talk or Credible 
Signals? Economic Interests and         the Construction of a Single 
Pension Market in Europe."
